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The Onion Routing (TOR) project is a network of virtual tunnels that facilitates secure, private
communicationsontheinternet.Arecentarticlepublishedin“TheRegistry”claimsthatTORbundle
browser usage has increased in recent years; statistics show that in January 2012, there were
approximately 950,000 users globally and now in August 2013 that figure is estimated to have
reached1,200,000users.ThereportalsoillustratesthatTheUnitedstatesofAmericaandtheUnited
Kingdom are major contributors towards the massive increase in TOR usage. Similarly, other
countrieslikeIndiaandBrazilhaveincreasedusageto32,000and85,000respectively.Thisresearch
paper will be an introduction and identifies the need for research in this area, and provides a
literature review on existing research. The objective of this paper is to discuss the existing
methodologies foranalysing forensicartefacts fromRAMfromtheuseof theTORbrowserbundle





Cyberwarzone reports claim that darknet contains index of more than 70,000 websites hosted






has become a great benefit for cybercriminals and unethical users for accessing all the available
illegalservicesorhostedhidden links.Therefore thiseasyaccess todarknethashikedcrimerates
involving illegal activities such as online drug dealing, child pornography, hidden wiki hosting
devices,crimeasaservice(Sharwood,2013).
AccordingtothearticlebyCyberwarzone,reportsclaimthatdarknetcontainsnearly600TBofdata




lackof monitoring control makes it difficult to forensically detect and identify the traffic. The
significanceofthestudyisrequiredtodevelopaforensicsoundmethodologytodetectTORbundle
browserusagefrommemorydumpofthewindowsmachine.Thisenablesanalysisandrecoveryof
theartefactsusingTORbundlebrowser fororganizationoreven jurisdictionpurpose (Murdoch&




Many authors have perused studies and research on darknet and different ways for establishing
connection throughmanyanonymousbrowsers.This includesdetectionofTORtrafficonnetwork












middleman nodes which volunteers to this traffic and goes to the exist node and then to the
destinationserver.TORusespublickeyforencryptingthetransmittingmessagesformultiplelayers




On analysing the TOR bundle browser operation and workings, it is evident that when a user


















analysis and documented traceable evidence that TOR bundle browser can leave in a windows
machine. The author has also analysed and recorded the directory path of TOR bundle browser








A similar analysiswas performed by Andrew Case on “DeAnonymizing Live CDs through Physical
Memory Analysis”,where the author has discussed different forensic techniques for recovery of





stored.However, the authorhasn’t proved the script’s practicalworkability for artefacts recovery






























trafficusingDecoys.For this research, theauthoruseddecoy traffic (bait) fordetecting theproxy
connectionsincludingTORbundlebrowsertraffic.Inthispaper,theauthorshavecreatedmanybait
servers and made the servers available in the TOR network. This implementation has been
performed by using IMAP and SMTP servers and entice credentials have been created so that
cybercriminalscanbeattractedtoaccesstheirservicesintheirhostedservers.Figure4, illustrates
the“Rogueexitnode”whichactsasabaitforTORusers,allthetrafficpassingthroughrogueexit






Theauthorstates that this researchpaperwillbebeneficial to identifyandanalyse thebehaviour
andstatisticofactivitiesontherogueexitnode.Asstatedearlier,thetrafficfromandtoexitnodes
aretheonlyunencryptedtrafficbytheTORnetwork.However,whenpassingthroughtherogueexit
node; this setup can collect statistics and particulars of the hosts connecting through that
compromisedexitnodeanditcannottraceothermiddlemannodes(previoushops)involvedinthe
TORnetworkrouting.ThismethodrevealstheIPaddressofthehostsenteringtheexitnodebutnot




In August 2013, it was confirmed that attackers had exploited the vulnerability in TOR bundle
browser Firefox pluginwhich can disclose the source IP address of the TOR users. Thismalicious
codewasinjectedfromadarknethostcalled“FreedomHosting”,theuserswhovisitedthishidden
servicewebsitewerecompromisedas itexploits thememorymanagementvulnerability inFirefox
browser(Goodin,2013).ThismaliciousJavaScriptwouldmakeFirefoxsendauniqueidentifiertoa
public server by which the source IP address can be traced back. I addition to this, a reverse
engineering security specialist claimed that thismalicious code reveals some of the IP address in
Reston,Virgina(POULSEN,2013).

However, if the TOR user does not visit that compromised hosted website then, the chance of
FirefoxpluginbeingexploitediscomparativelylowtodetecttheTORartefacts.Ontheotherhand,








Memorydumpanalysis has always been a critical and interesting area for forensic investigations.


























As thememorydumpcontains significant information,analysing it forensicallywillhelp todetect,
recoverandanalyseartefactsofTORbundlebrowserusage.





5) for extracting the graphic content information from the memory dump of windows based
machine(Kiltz,Hoppe,&Dittmann,2009).Inaddition,theauthorsalsodevelopedaforensicmodel
(figure 6) used for this research. The extraction process (figure 5) used by Stephan et al (2011)
















Figure 6, illustrates the proposed forensic model with different data type for extracting graphic







termed as temporarymemory in some area of researchwhich stores information about running




















A similar memory dump analysis using volatility framework was performed by Chad Tilbury and
cheatsheetwasdevelopednamed“MemoryForensicsCheatsheetv1.1”.Inthispaper,theauthor






























Windows registry is significant area for recovering and analysing potential evidence about each
event on awindowsmachine. Shuhui Zhang et al (2011) haveproposed amethod for recovering
windowsregistryinformationfromthememorydump.Figure7istheproposedflowchartbyShuhui
Zhangetal(2011)forextractingtheHIVEfilesfromthememorydump.SincetheHivefilescontain












































Table 2 shows summarization of the literature review on techniques available for retrieving TOR
bundle browser artefacts. It is evident that many researchers have explored the techniques for
recoveringevidenceofTORtrafficonnetworksandbysettingupbaitexitnode(rogueexitnode).
Similarly,researcheshavecarriedonretrievingtheartefactsofTORusagefromWindowsandLinux

















































































































































































































































































































































































































 The PC will be installed with latest version of TOR bundle browser for this project.









 Analysis and examination will be performed using memory dump forensic tools such as the






Date Time Comments ActionTakenBy Investigator1










Date  Time  Filename  Investigator 
PathFound 
HashValue MD5  SHA1 









Figure 10 illustrates the proposed research environment setup for perusing this project. In this
scenario, twoendpointsarebearrangedby theauthor,oneof theendpoints isamachinewith
windows operating system and the second end point will be a windows web server. Both the
windowsmachineswill be installedwith TORbundle browserwith appropriate plugins.Once the
setupiscompleted,thewindowsmachinewillaccessfilesorcommunicatewiththewebserverand
routeonlyTORtraffic.Asdepictedintheabovefigure10,thecommunicationbetweenthewindows
machineandweb server is carriedby volunteered TORnodes in the TORnetwork. These are the
machineallover theworldwithTORbundlebrowser installed.Afteraccessing the filesusingTOR
network,thememorydumpofthewindowsmachinewillbecapturedinforensicallysoundmanner
using“dumpit” software. Finally, thememorydumpwillbeanalysedandartefactsof TORbundle









































information from physical memory. Paper presented at the Computer Research and
Development(ICCRD),20113rdInternationalConferenceon.
Tilbury,Chad.(n.d.).MemoryForensicsCheatSheetv1.1.


 
